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Introduction 
Ohio’s charter-closure law is touted as one of the toughest in 
the nation because it requires the automatic closure of charter 
schools that consistently fail to meet academic standards. The 
law has been showcased by the National Association of Charter 
School Authorizers (NACSA) in its “One Million Lives” 
campaign, which calls for tougher state laws to close failing 
charter schools.1  
 
The widespread attention and support of the NACSA campaign 
has pushed Ohio’s closure law into the spotlight as a model of 
accountability for low-performing charter schools. However, 
The Plain Dealer’s editorial board, in a commentary on 
NACSA’s praise of Ohio’s charter school accountability 
standards, pointed out what NACSA did not: Ohio’s charter 
school laws, while they may have stronger mandates for 
closure than those of other states, are still replete with 
loopholes.2 Since the charter-closure law went into effect in 
2008, 20 schools across the state have met closure criteria, and 
all are currently listed as closed by the Ohio Department of 
Education (ODE). But an investigation of the schools by Policy Matters revealed that eight schools – 
and the management companies that run them – have found ways to skirt the closure law and remain 
open, severely undermining the law’s effectiveness and highlighting the lax accountability that 
prevails in Ohio’s charter sector. For-profit managers – the Leona Group, Mosaica Education and 
White Hat Management – operate six of the reopened schools 
 
Automatic closure 
Ohio’s charter-closure law, which became effective in 2008 and was revised in 2011, calls for 
automatic closure of schools rated in Academic Emergency for at least two of the three most recent 
school years. To be subject to the law, charters serving grades four through eight also must show less 
than one year of academic growth in either reading or math in that time period.3 
                                                
1 NACSA press release on 11/28/12: “A Call for Quality” 
2 “Tougher charter school standards praised – by charter group: editorial” The Plain Dealer. November 28, 2012. 
http://www.cleveland.com/opinion/index.ssf/2012/11/tougher_charter_school_standar.html  
3 This provision applies only to schools serving children in grades four to eight because Ohio’s standardized testing 
measures academic progress only in those grades and only in reading and math. 
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Oversight of these criteria primarily falls on authorized sponsors, which are responsible for 
evaluating and reporting on the academic and financial performance of their sponsored schools, and 
on ODE. The automatic closure law calls for schools meeting the criteria to be closed permanently, 
and it requires the school’s sponsor and its governing authority to comply with state-mandated 
procedures for closing the school. The law forbids the governing authority (the school board) of a 
school marked for automatic closure from entering into a contract with any other charter school 
sponsor after the school closes.4  
 
The loophole in the law 
Despite tough legislation, weak oversight of Ohio’s charter sector continues to allow evasion of the 
closure law by charter management organizations (CMOs). While Ohio law sets up charter school 
boards as the entity to be held legally responsible for a school’s academic and financial performance, 
it does not do the same for management companies, many of them for-profit, that are contracted by 
schools to manage their daily operations. These companies are often in charge of making major 
decisions for a school, including hiring and firing teachers, assessing academic performance, 
contracting with vendors, budgeting, developing curriculum, and providing basic classroom 
materials. Yet the closure law places no penalty on CMOs when their schools meet academic closure 
criteria. This omission creates a loophole for managers to keep “closed” schools open and continue to 
receive public funds for failing schools.  
 
Policy Matters Ohio examined charter schools on ODE’s closure list and found that several – all but 
one managed by CMOs – are still open despite their “closed” status. For-profit CMOs run six of the 
schools, the non-profit Summit Academies operates one, and the last is independently operated. 
While these schools have new names, Policy Matters discovered that the old, closed schools and the 
new schools opened in their places had significant – in some cases nearly complete – staff overlap, 
and that all the new schools remained at the same address where the old schools had operated. Table 
1 provides an overview of these schools, along with their location and CMO.  
 
                                                
4 Ohio Revised Code 3314.35 http://codes.ohio.gov/orc/3314.35. 
 Ohio charters closed for poor academics, reopened in same location 
Old school New school Location CMO 
Hope Academy Canton 
Brighten Heights Academy/Garfield 
Academy Canton White Hat Management 
W.E.B. DuBois 
Cinci Speech & Reading 
Intervention Center 
Cincinnati Independent 
Hope Academy Broadway Broadway Academy Cleveland White Hat Management 
Hope Academy Cathedral Woodland Academy Cleveland White Hat Management 
Paul Laurence Dunbar Academy Northpointe Academy Toledo The Leona Group 
Academy of Arts & Humanities STEAM Academy of Warren Warren Mosaica Education 
Eagle Heights Academy Southside Academy Youngstown Independent/White Hat 
Summit Academy Community School for 
Alternative Learners of Youngstown Summit Academy Youngstown Youngstown Summit Academies 
Sources: Ohio Department of Education, news reports, and Policy Matters Ohio analysis. 
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Closing failing charters 
In February 2011, Policy Matters reported on the required closure of Paul Laurence Dunbar 
Academy, a K-8 charter school in Toledo operated by the Leona Group, a Phoenix-based, for-profit 
management firm.5 Paul Laurence Dunbar Academy was placed on the state’s closure list for poor 
academic performance and was required to be shut down by the end of June 2010; however, by July 
2, 2010, the Leona Group had opened a new school, Northpointe Academy, at the same location and 
with much of the same staff. The Leona Group’s re-opening of Paul Laurence Dunbar Academy 
under a new name is just one of several cases in which charter management companies have skirted 
Ohio’s automatic closure law. This paper examines these cases to show how charter schools are being 
kept open in spite of consistently failing academic records. 
 
Since the Ohio legislature first established charters in Ohio, the state has taken a quantity-over-
quality approach to approving new schools and allowing troubled schools to continue. National 
studies that have included Ohio have found that overall, the majority of charter schools do no better 
than demographically comparable district counterparts.6 The state’s closure law was put in place to 
deal with the glut of ineffective charter schools that have for too long betrayed the promise of 
charters in Ohio. But our investigation shows that despite its seemingly strict closure law, Ohio still 
falls short of the meaningful oversight and accountability needed to improve the state’s charter sector. 
 
Until legislators and the charter sector in Ohio begin to take accountability and academic quality 
more seriously, families and children that would benefit most from quality education will be ill-
served by Ohio’s charter schools. 
 
Case No. 1: Eagle Heights Academy 
Eagle Heights Academy, a K-8 charter school in 
Youngstown, was required to close by the end of June 
2010 due to consistent Academic Emergency ratings. 
Ohio Council of Community Schools (OCCS) 
sponsored the school, which was located at 1833 
Market Street in Youngstown. The Ohio Department of 
Education lists its official closure date as June 30, 
2010.7 
 
Within days of Eagle Heights’ closing, a new school 
serving grades K-8, Southside Academy, was set to 
open at the same location. When Southside Academy 
opened for the 2010-11 school year, it had the same 
sponsor, OCCS, and retained the Eagle Heights 
principal and 36 of its staff members, including 21 
                                                
5 “Toledo charter school re-opening skirts Ohio law.” Policy Matters Ohio 15 February 2011. 
http://www.policymattersohio.org/toledo-charter-school%C2%A0re-opening-skirts-ohio-law  
6 See, for example, Rand Corporation, Charter Schools in Eight States, at http://bit.ly/XFfchX and CREDO/Standford 
University, Multiple Choice: Charter School Performance in 16 States, at http://credo.stanford.edu/research-reports.html.  
7 All school data found in the Ohio Department of Education’s Annual Reports on Ohio Community Schools and its 
Directory of Community Schools and Sponsors, online at http://bit.ly/SiypcC. 
Case No. 1 
Eagle Heights 
Academy 
Southside 
Academy 
144 N. Schenley Ave 144 N. Schenley Ave 
Youngstown Youngstown 
Closed June 30, 2010 Opened August 2010 
Sponsored by OCCS Sponsored by OCCS 
Independent CMO: White Hat 
Total staff overlap: 36 (21 teaching, 15 other) 
$9.8 million in state funding since re-opening 
Southside Academy in Continuous Improvement* 
Source: ODE; White Hat Management website. * 2011-12 
preliminary report card rating. 
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teachers, aides, and instructional support staff.8 Unlike Eagle Heights, which was independently 
operated, Southside Academy contracted Ohio’s largest charter school operator, the for-profit White 
Hat Management, to run the school. Despite the new name and management, the use of the same 
building and staff raise the question: Would the typical observer consider Southside Academy a new 
school, or would it simply appear to be the same school with a new name?  
 
In addition to its academic shortcomings, in May 2010, the state auditor found “extensive fiscal 
mismanagement” at Eagle Heights Academy and declared a lack of proper financial oversight at the 
school – oversight that according to Ohio charter school law should have been provided by OCCS, 
the school’s sponsor. The mismanagement included $454,381 in federal income tax and Medicare 
withholdings never given to the IRS, over $700,000 in questionable costs, and $33,500 of illegal one-
time payments to 29 employees from a federal grant. 
 
In the three years prior to closure, Eagle Heights received over $18 million in state funding. 
Southside Academy has taken in over $9.8 million since its opening in 2010.9  
 
Case No. 2: Paul Laurence Dunbar Academy 
Paul Laurence Dunbar Academy, a Toledo charter 
school serving grades K-8, was ordered to close by the 
end of June 2010 for consistent academic failure. Like 
Eagle Heights Academy, Dunbar was sponsored by 
OCCS. It was operated by the Leona Group, a for-profit 
charter management company based in Arizona. 
Between 2007 and 2010, Dunbar Academy received 
$3,686,910 in state funding. 
 
ODE marked Dunbar’s closing date as June 30, 2010, 
but by July 2, 2010, the Leona Group had already 
opened a new school, Northpointe Academy, at the 
same Warsaw Street site. Northpointe Academy, also 
sponsored by OCCS, was originally another Leona 
Group school, Great Lakes Environmental Academy 
(GLEA), which served grades 7-12 at a different location. During the 2009-10 school year, GLEA’s 
name was changed to Northpointe Academy (the school’s state-issued identification number, or IRN, 
remained the same), and Northpointe took over Dunbar’s location, 3248 Warsaw Street in Toledo. 
The staff and administration of GLEA, however, stayed behind and became the 7-12 expansion of 
another Leona Group school, Wildwood Environmental Academy, while the principal and 15 staff 
members of Dunbar Academy moved into nearly identical positions at Northpointe Academy without 
moving to a new address.10  
 
                                                
8 All school staff data found through ODE’s Power User Reports at http://ilrc.ode.state.oh.us/Power_Users.asp. 
9 All state funding amounts are from ODE’s Community School Payment Reports  
10 van Lier, Piet, “Charter School Re-opening Skirts Charter School Law,” Policy Matters Ohio,  February 15, 2011. 
Retrieved at http://www.policymattersohio.org/?p=902. 
Case No. 2 
Dunbar 
Academy 
Northpointe 
Academy 
3248 Warsaw Street 3248 Warsaw Street 
Toledo Toledo 
Closed June 30, 2010 Opened July 2010 
Sponsor: OCCS Sponsor: OCCS 
CMO: Leona Group CMO: Leona Group 
Staff overlap: 16 (principal, 8 teaching, 7 other) 
$6.5 million in state funding since re-opening 
Northpointe Academy rated Effective* 
Source: ODE and Leona Group website. *2011-12 preliminary 
report card rating – school improvement status delayed. 
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In a March 2011 Toledo Blade article, an ODE spokesperson called the Leona Group’s actions 
“legal.”11 Northpointe Academy, which now serves grades K-6, still employs 14 staff members from 
Dunbar Academy, including Principal Andre Fox. The school’s enrollment jumped significantly in 
2010-11 but fell after dropping grades seven and eight last year; it has also improved from Academic 
Watch to Effective.12 Since 2010, Northpointe Academy has received just over $6.5 million in state 
funding. 
 
Case No. 3: Hope Academy Canton 
Hope Academy Canton, a K-8 charter 
school in Canton, was ordered to close in 
June 2010 by its sponsor, St. Aloysius 
Orphanage, which did not renew its 
contract because of the school’s poor 
academic performance. Operated by the 
for-profit White Hat Management, Hope 
Academy Canton failed to rate higher than 
Academic Watch and was at risk for being 
closed by the state for academic failure. In 
the three years prior to closure, the school 
received nearly $7.4 million in state 
funding.  
 
Instead of closing in June 2010 as ordered, 
however, Hope Academy Canton was kept 
alive through the expansion of another 
White Hat-operated school, Life Skills 
Center Canton, a dropout-recovery 
program. Under the expansion, the schools merged to become Brighten Heights Academy, operated 
by White Hat and sponsored by Ohio Council of Community Schools (OCCS).13 Despite its status as 
a single school, Brighten Heights maintained the two existing campuses: a high school at the former 
Life Skills Center location (1100 Cleveland Ave NW) and a K-8 at the former Hope Academy site 
(1379 Garfield Ave. SW). Twenty-one staff members from Hope Academy Canton, including 19 
teachers and aides, stayed on at Brighten Heights. 
 
The merger between Hope Academy Canton and Life Skills Center Canton lasted for one school 
year, during which Brighten Heights received a rating of Academic Watch and took in $3 million in 
state funding. By the 2011-12 school year, Life Skills Center Canton was back to its original name, 
and a new school, Garfield Academy, took the place of the Brighten Heights K-8 school. Garfield 
Academy is one of White Hat’s Hope Academies, just like Hope Academy Canton.  
 
Ohio law prohibits boards of charter schools shut down by the state’s closure law from contracting 
with a new sponsor, and the same five-member school board that ran its predecessor, Hope Academy 
                                                
11 Rosenkrans, Nolan,“Origin of school questioned,” Toledo Blade, March 23, 2011, retrieved at http://bit.ly/XXntCV. 
12 All report card data found on ODE’s Interactive Local Report Card site, http://ilrc.ode.state.oh.us. 
13 Griffy Seeton, Melissa, “New name, new ‘Hope,’ but new school?,” Cantonrep.com, July 18, 2010 
http://www.cantonrep.com/news/x1814121457/New-name-new-Hope-but-new-school  
Case No. 3 
Hope 
Academy 
Canton 
Brighten 
Heights 
Academy 
Garfield 
Academy 
1379 Garfield Ave  1379 Garfield Ave 1379 Garfield Ave 
Canton Canton Canton 
Closed June 30, 
2010 
Merged with Life 
Skills Ctr Canton 
2010-11 school year 
Opened August 
2011 
Sponsor: St. 
Aloysius 
Orphanage 
Sponsor: OCCS 
Sponsor: Buckeye 
Community Hope 
Foundation 
CMO: White Hat CMO: White Hat CMO: White Hat 
Staff overlap (from Hope to Garfield): 23  
(17 teaching, 6 other) 
$3.8 million in state funding since re-opening 
Garfield Academy rated in Academic Emergency* 
Source: ODE; White Hat website. *2011-12 preliminary report card rating 
Avoiding Accountability 
www.policymattersohio.org 6 
Canton, governs the new Garfield Academy. But since Hope Academy Canton was ordered to close 
by its sponsor, St. Aloysius, and was still a year away from meeting the state’s automatic closure 
criteria, Garfield Academy’s board members are not technically in violation of the law for contracting 
with Buckeye Community Hope Foundation as its sponsor.  
 
It must be noted, however, that the decision to merge schools and subsequently create a new school in 
the same location on Garfield Avenue allowed White Hat Management, and the board members, to 
avoid the looming closure that Hope Academy Canton’s poor academic performance was about to 
trigger. In receiving a new charter for Garfield Academy, White Hat is assured of at least five more 
years of operation even though it is essentially the same school, with much of the same staff, that 
existed under the name of Hope Academy Canton. Twenty-eight Brighten Heights Academy staff 
members were on the 2011-12 Garfield Academy staff list, and 23 of those – of a total staff of 32 – 
had been employed at Hope Academy Canton.  
 
Improved academic outcomes have not been a part of this story. Garfield Academy was rated in 
Academic Emergency last year. Since its opening, the school and its management company have 
taken in more than $3.8 million in state funding.  
 
Case No. 4: Academy of Arts & Humanities 
Academy of Arts & Humanities, a K-8 charter 
school in Warren, became subject to the closure 
law in 2011 after repeated Academic Emergency 
ratings. Sponsored by St. Aloysius Orphanage and 
operated by the for-profit charter management 
company Mosaica Education, the Academy of Arts 
& Humanities received over $6.5 million in state 
funding from 2007 to 2011. According to ODE 
records, the school closed on June 30, 2011. 
Mosaica is an international company with offices 
in New York and Atlanta that runs schools across 
the U.S., in Britain, the United Arab Emirates and 
India. 
 
When ODE forced the closure of the Academy of 
Arts & Humanities, Mosaica started, at the same 
location, the STEAM Academy of Warren in time for the 2011-12 school year. Sponsored by Portage 
County Educational Service Center, STEAM Academy (for Science, Technology, Engineering, Arts 
and Math) opened its doors with eight staff members from Academy of Arts & Humanities. The new 
school has received ratings of Academic Emergency and Academic Watch over the past two school 
years and received over $1.8 million in state funding since 2011. 
 
  
Case No. 4 
Academy of Arts 
& Humanities 
STEAM 
Academy 
261 Elm Road NE 261 Elm Road NE 
Warren Warren 
Closed June 30, 2011 Opened August 2011 
Sponsor: St. Aloysius 
Orphanage 
Sponsor: Portage County 
ESC 
CMO: Mosaica CMO: Mosaica 
Staff overlap: 8 (5 teaching, 3 other) 
$1.8 million in state funding since re-opening 
STEAM Academy in Academic Watch* 
Source: ODE; Mosaica website. *2011-12 preliminary report card rating 
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Case No. 5: Summit Academy Community School for Alternative 
Learners of Youngstown 
Summit Academy Community School for 
Alternative Learners of Youngstown, a K-8 
charter school, opened with the mission of 
providing an education alternative for students 
with mild to moderate learning and behavior 
disabilities. Located at 144 N. Schenley Avenue 
in Youngstown, the school was operated by the 
non-profit Summit Academy Management and 
sponsored by Lucas County Educational Service 
Center. After three consecutive years in 
Academic Emergency, the state required 
Youngstown’s Summit Academy to close by the 
end of June 2009. According to ODE records, it 
officially closed its doors on May 29, 2009. 
 
Although the school building was closed in May 
2009, Summit Academy Management was able to 
keep its Youngstown K-8 school open by adding 
grade levels to one of its existing schools, 
Summit Academy Middle School – Youngstown. In 2008-09, the middle school, located at 810 Oak 
St. in Youngstown, served grades 6-8; by the following school year it had expanded to grades K-8 
and was re-named Summit Academy Youngstown. By the 2010-11 school year, the expanded and 
newly renamed Summit Academy Youngstown moved to its current location, 144 N. Schenley Ave, 
the former site of Summit Academy Community School of Alternative Learners of Youngstown, the 
K-8 that had been closed by the state.  
 
A review of ODE records revealed that in the 2009-10 school year, Summit Academy Youngstown 
employed 54 staff members that had been employed at Summit Academy Community School for 
Alternative Learners of Youngstown during the 2008-09 school year. In fact, during 2008-09, the two 
schools shared 63 staff members, mostly in administrative positions, and after the merger, half of 
Summit Academy Youngstown’s teaching staff were teachers and aides from Summit Academy 
Community School for Alternative Learners of Youngstown.  
 
Summit Academy Management currently operates 26 charter schools in Ohio. Lucas County 
Educational Service Center, which has since merged into the newly created sponsor known as 
Educational Service Center of Lake Erie West, was the sponsor of both schools before the merger and 
continues to sponsor Summit Academy Youngstown, as well as 23 other Summit Academies across 
the state. In the three years prior to required closure, Summit Academy Community School for 
Alternative Learners of Youngstown received just over $7.3 million in state funding. Since the school 
merger in 2009, Summit Academy Youngstown remains in Academic Emergency and has taken in 
over $11.8 million in state funds. 
 
  
Case No. 5 
Summit Academy 
for Alternative 
Learners of 
Youngstown 
Summit Academy 
Youngstown 
144 N. Schenley Ave 144 N. Schenley Ave 
Youngstown Youngstown 
Closed May 29, 2009 Expanded to K-8 August 
2010 
Sponsor: Lucas County ESC Sponsor: ESC of Lake Erie 
West (formerly Lucas County 
ESC) 
CMO: Summit Academy CMO: Summit Academy 
Staff Overlap: 54 (20 teaching, 34 other) 
$11.8 million in state funding since re-opening 
Summit Academy Youngstown in Academic Emergency* 
Source: ODE; Summit Academy Management website. *2011-12 
preliminary report card rating. 
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Case No. 6: Hope Academy Cathedral 
Hope Academy Cathedral, a White Hat-operated 
charter school in Cleveland, was ordered closed 
in 2011 after three consecutive years in Academic 
Emergency. Located at 10615 Lamontier Ave, 
Hope Cathedral served grades K-8 and was 
sponsored by Buckeye Community Hope 
Foundation. In the three years before ODE 
required it to close, Hope Cathedral took in 
nearly $12 million in state funds. According to 
ODE’s list of closed schools, Hope Cathedral 
closed on May 26, 2011. 
 
Less than two months later, the for-profit White 
Hat sent out a press release announcing the 
opening of a new school, Woodland Academy, at 
the same Lamontier Avenue location. Also 
serving grades K-8, Woodland Academy held its grand opening on July 16, 2011, providing free 
handouts and entertainment to prospective students and families in addition to promising “a special 
guest from the Mayor’s office.”14 When Woodland Academy opened for the 2011-12 school year, 15 
former Hope Cathedral staff members, including 8 teachers, were on the staff roster. Like Hope 
Cathedral, Buckeye Community Hope Foundation sponsored Woodland. Woodland received a rating 
of Academic Emergency in its first year and has received over $6.3 million in state funding since 
opening. 
 
Case No. 7: Hope Academy Broadway 
Hope Academy Broadway, another White Hat-
operated charter school, served grades K-8 until 
being ordered closed in June 2010 for repeated 
academic failure. Hope Broadway was located at 
3398 E. 55th St. in Cleveland and was sponsored 
by OCCS. From 2007 to 2010, the school 
received more than $10 million in state funds.  
 
Hope Broadway closed its doors a year earlier 
than required because its board could not find a 
sponsor for the 2010-11 school year. By the 
following school year, however, a new charter 
school, Broadway Academy opened its doors at 
the former Hope Broadway site.15 Sponsored by 
St. Aloysius Orphanage, Broadway Academy is a 
K-8 school operated by White Hat. It retained 11 former Hope Broadway staff members and added 
three former Hope Cathedral teachers to its roster.  
                                                
14 White Hat Management press release http://www.wediducan.com/uploads/296001310397251.pdf  
15 White Hat Management press release http://www.wediducan.com/uploads/29321310397238.pdf. 
Case No. 6 
Hope Academy 
Cathedral 
Woodland 
Academy 
10615 Lamontier Ave 10615 Lamontier Ave 
Cleveland Cleveland 
Closed May 26, 2011 Opened August 2011 
Sponsor: Buckeye Community 
Hope Foundation 
Sponsor: Buckeye Community 
Hope Foundation 
CMO: White Hat CMO: White Hat 
Staff Overlap: 15 (8 teaching, 7 other) 
$6.3 million in state funding since re-opening 
Woodland Academy in Academic Emergency* 
Sources: ODE; White Hat Management website. *2011-12 preliminary 
report card rating 
Case No. 7 
Hope Academy 
Broadway 
Broadway 
Academy 
3398 E. 55th Street 3398 E. 55th Street 
Cleveland Cleveland 
Closed June 30, 2010 Opened August 2011 
Sponsor: OCCS 
Sponsor: St. Aloysius 
Orphanage 
CMO: White Hat CMO: White Hat 
Staff overlap: 11 (5 teaching, 6 other) 
$4.5 million in state funding since re-opening 
Broadway Academy in Academic Emergency* 
Source: ODE; White Hat Management website. *2011-12 preliminary 
report card rating. 
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Broadway Academy received a rating of Academic Emergency in 2011-12, and has taken in more 
than $4.5 million in state funding since opening. 
 
Case No. 8: W.E.B. DuBois Academy 
W.E.B. DuBois Academy, an independently run 
Cincinnati charter school serving grades four to 
eight, was placed on ODE’s closure list in 2009 
after three straight Academic Emergency ratings. 
It received more than $3.6 million in state funds 
from 2007 to 2010. According to ODE records, 
DuBois Academy, sponsored by Educational 
Resource Consultants of Ohio, closed on June 30, 
2010.  
 
Despite the state-mandated closure, the 
Cincinnati Enquirer reported in June 2010 that 
the DuBois Academy board had other plans. 
Edward Burdell, a DuBois board member, told 
the Enquirer DuBois’ sister school, Cincinnati 
Speech and Reading Intervention Center (CSR) 
would expand from K-3 to K-8 and move into the DuBois Academy building to accommodate its 
student population.16 Prior to its 2010 required closure, DuBois Academy had its share of 
controversy. Once celebrated for its academic achievement, the school originally announced it would 
close in May 2006 due to financial difficulties stemming from over-payment by the state for DuBois’ 
extended school year. School officials said the school could not survive on the corrected aid amount 
and would be unable to repay the $3 million it was overpaid.17 After contracting with a new sponsor, 
DuBois Academy was kept open, only to have its founder, Wilson Willard indicted, and later 
convicted, on charges of theft and record-tampering. Willard falsified student enrollment records in 
order to receive more state funding and used public funds meant for the school to renovate his home. 
A 2009 Ohio Auditor report revealed Willard and another school employee cheated the school and 
state taxpayers for more than $700,000.18 
 
Records for both DuBois and CSR reveal a pattern of high teacher turnover in recent years. The 
2010-11 CSR staff list shows only three of eight CSR teachers from 2009-10 remained employed by 
the school. Three DuBois Academy teachers were also on the 2010-11 CSR staff list. CSR was rated 
in Academic Watch in 2007-08 and was not rated by ODE from 2008 to 2010. After the expansion to 
K-8 in 2010-11, it received a rating of Academic Emergency for one year before moving to 
Continuous Improvement in 2011-12. CSR has taken in just over $5 million in state funding since its 
2010 merger with DuBois Academy. 
 
  
                                                
16 Brown, Jessica, “Two charter schools face closure,” Cincinnati Enquirer, June 17, 2010. 
17 Elliot, S, “Cash crunch to close charter school darling,” Dayton Daily News blog Get On the Bus, May 27, 2006. 
18 Ohio Auditor of State press release, April 2, 2009 http://www.auditor.state.oh.us/newscenter/press/release/670/  
Case No. 8 
W.E.B. DuBois 
Academy 
Cincinnati 
Speech & 
Reading  
1812 Central Parkway 1812 Central Parkway 
Cincinnati Cincinnati 
Closed June 30, 2010 Expanded to K-8 July 2010 
Sponsor: Ed. Resource 
Consultants of OH 
Sponsor: Richland Academy 
Independent Independent 
Staff overlap: 3 (all teaching) 
$5 million in state funding since merger 
CSR in Continuous Improvement* 
Source: ODE. *2011-12 preliminary report card rating. 
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Letting CMOs and sponsors off the hook 
It requires no great leap of logic to conclude that CMOs hold a great deal of responsibility for a 
school’s academic failings, but as this study shows, management companies running failed charter 
schools have been able to escape responsibility time and time again. For-profit management 
companies – the Leona Group, Mosaica Education, and White Hat Management – run six of the eight 
schools investigated for this report. White Hat, a repeat offender that has kept a number of failed 
schools open, was sued in 2010 by the boards of 10 White Hat-managed schools (including Hope 
Academy Cathedral and Hope Academy Broadway), partly on the grounds that it was abusing the 
“unchecked authority” granted to charter managers in state law.19 The controversial law permits 
sponsors to remove a charter school governing board if the board decides to terminate a contract with 
its CMO, and gives the company the right to appoint a school board to its liking and continue 
management of the school.20 Ohio’s law gives too much power to sponsors and CMOs. The law 
makes it difficult to have strong, independent charter school boards that can make decisions based on 
the best interest of their students. It also allows for uncomfortably close relationships between 
sponsors and charter managers, both of which have strong financial incentives to maintain a school’s 
operation regardless of its academic performance. 
   
CMO accountability was further diminished in 2011 when Ohio legislators repealed Ohio’s “highly 
qualified operator” provision. The repeal gives new start-up charter schools the option of contracting 
with CMOs that do not meet previously prescribed performance standards, effectively eliminating 
academic accountability for CMOs.21 Unfortunately, these recent legislative changes are reflective of 
Ohio’s weak regulation of CMOs, which continue to receive a free pass from state lawmakers. 
Similarly, aside from losing revenue – up to 3 percent of the state funding of schools they authorize – 
sponsors are not penalized when schools are closed under their watch.22 Sponsors can have their right 
to authorize new schools taken away if ODE finds them non-compliant with reporting requirements, 
or if the composite performance index of their schools puts them into the lowest 20 percent of 
sponsors.23 Of the sponsors in this study, Richland Academy and Portage County ESC are in the 
bottom 20 percent and are no longer allowed to sponsor new schools; they do maintain sponsorship 
of schools already under contract.24 
 
SB 316, passed by the Ohio General Assembly in June 2012, conceded the lack of accountability for 
sponsors, and new legislation on charter school sponsorship accountability is currently being 
considered.25 The proposed legislation, HB 555, would go into effect for the 2015-16 school year and 
adds components on the sponsor’s adherence to quality practices and standards. It leaves the 
responsibility of determining the practices and standards that sponsors will be measured by to ODE 
and the state school board, but the legislation currently includes language that would give ODE the 
right to revoke sponsorship rights from non-compliant sponsors.26 This is a step in the right direction, 
                                                
19 Marshall, Aaron, “10 Northeast Ohio charter school boards sue White Hat Management firm,” Cleveland Plain Dealer, 
May 18, 2010 http://www.cleveland.com/open/index.ssf/2010/05/for-profit_management_company.html  
20 Ohio Revised Code 3314.026 – Termination of contract with operator. 
21 Ulmer Berne LLP, H.B. 153 Community School Summary, retrieved at http://bit.ly/SX8QvN.  
22 Ohio Revised Code 3301-102-04 A(3). Sponsorship Agreement. http://codes.ohio.gov/oac/3301-102-04  
23 Ohio Revised Code 3301-102-07 – Revocation of sponsorship authority. http://codes.ohio.gov/oac/3301-102-07  
24 From the “Sponsor Composite Performance Index & Reporting Compliance” document found on the ODE website. 
25 From the Ohio Legislative Service Commission’s (OLSC) Final Analysis of SB 316. at http://bit.ly/Tdgpgy.  
26 From the OLSC Bill Analysis of HB 555, at http://www.lsc.state.oh.us/analyses129/h0555-i-129.pdf. 
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but we will not know how effective the new accountability measures will be until the new sponsor 
rating system is unveiled.  
 
Conclusion 
Policy Matters has documented that of the 20 charter schools ODE has required to close for academic 
reasons, seven have essentially remained intact, skirting the automatic closure law.27 In some cases, 
management companies have expanded the charters of other schools to incorporate grade levels 
served by closed schools – a practice deemed legal by ODE. In other cases CMO-operated schools 
facing automatic closure were replaced by nearly identical schools, managed by the same company 
with much of the same staff. An eighth school, Hope Academy Canton, was ordered closed by its 
sponsor a year before it would have been shut down by the state. In this case, our investigation 
showed that by closing early and opening a new school in the same location with much of the same 
staff, the schools’ for-profit operator, White Hat Management, bought five additional years of life – 
and revenue – for a low-performing school. In more than half the cases we examined, the new 
schools’ academic performance remained the same as the old schools’; five of the eight “new” 
schools are still ranked in Academic Watch or Emergency, while their management companies and 
sponsors continue to take in millions of dollars in public funding. For-profit CMOs – the Leona 
Group, Mosaica Education, and White Hat Management – run six of the eight schools we 
investigated. The non-profit Summit Academies runs one, and one is operated independently. 
 
Despite the appearance of being tough on academically failing charter schools, Ohio’s automatic 
closure law has glaring loopholes that undermine its effectiveness and the overall quality of its 
charter schools. Because it holds only charter school boards responsible for academic failure, the law 
allows sponsors and CMOs to evade accountability and keep poorly performing schools open. Our 
investigation shows that Ohio’s charter-closure law is at best a superficial attempt to close poorly 
performing schools and improve Ohio’s charter sector; by failing to set firm consequences for 
sponsors and CMOs, the law only succeeds in punishing students. Charter advocates and education 
reformers speak often of doing what’s best for children, not for adults, but in light of the evidence, 
these words sound like little more than empty rhetoric, at least in Ohio. 
 
Ultimately, responsibility lies with Ohio policymakers for refusing to hold sponsors and CMOs 
accountable for the academic failures of their schools. Ohio’s lawmakers have given too much power 
to CMOs, while simultaneously absolving them of responsibility. Also at fault is ODE, which by 
turning a blind (and understaffed) eye, and on at least one occasion recognizing loopholes as “legal,” 
has allowed questionable practices by sponsors and CMOs to go unchecked. Ohio’s charter-closure 
law will never be tough enough without provisions placing the burden of accountability on CMOs. 
Until the closure laws are strengthened, sponsors must do more to ensure that schools facing closure 
are closed. Sponsors, in continuing to approve contracts that put the reins of new schools back in the 
hands of the CMOs that failed in the first place, violate the spirit of the law and weaken the efforts to 
hold charter schools accountable for their academic performance. There is no excuse for those who 
keep failed charter schools open, and it is time for policymakers and charter advocates to take real 
action against those who do. 
 
  
                                                
27 ODE’s “List of Closed Schools” was retrieved at http://1.usa.gov/UauYUm.  
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Recommendations 
In the 2010 report, “Authorized Abuse: Sponsors, Management, and Ohio Charter School Law,” 
Policy Matters Ohio called for an overhaul of Ohio charter school law to increase standards for more 
effective sponsor oversight of management-school board relationships.28 This study provides further 
proof that Ohio’s charter school laws do not provide the necessary framework for meaningful 
oversight of the charter sector.  
 
Based on this study, Policy Matters Ohio recommends the following: 
• Revamp the closure law – Legislators must change the law to include accountability 
measures for the sponsors and charter management organizations of schools meeting closure 
criteria. The reworked law should ensure that sponsors, CMOs and school boards do not sign 
new contracts that circumvent the closure of academically failing schools. 
• Strengthen oversight – ODE’s capacity to oversee closure of charter schools is woefully 
inadequate. The department should have, and exercise, increased capacity to provide 
meaningful oversight. This should include the power to refuse the expansion of charter 
contracts, which has allowed charter managers to merge closed schools with other schools 
they run. Legislators, ODE, and the state school board must also push forward on proposed 
legislation to better measure sponsor performance, increase accountability of sponsors, and 
revoke the approval of non-compliant sponsors. ODE and the state board, as they promote 
quality practices and standards for charter sponsors, should include tough penalties for 
sponsors that help keep failed charter schools open. 
• Hold charter managers accountable – Ohio’s charter closure law does not reflect the 
considerable role CMOs play in the failure of a charter school, leaving management firms free 
of blame and, even worse, free to manage new schools despite their failures. Ohio lawmakers 
need to push for stronger accountability measures for charter management organizations and 
push out those that have a history of academic failure and non-compliance. It is unfortunate 
that in 2011 the legislature repealed the relatively weak operator provision that kept charter 
managers with no schools rated at least at Continuous Improvement – the equivalent of a C 
grade – from authorizing new schools. This represents a step in the wrong direction for Ohio’s 
charter sector; policymakers should have made the operator provision tougher, not weaker. 
 
Charter law in Ohio remains ineffective and weak. Until Ohio gets serious about quality in the charter 
sector – both on the front end, by preventing operators with weak track records from opening new 
schools, and by creating a more meaningful charter-closure law – Ohio will continue to fall short of 
the goal of strengthening its public education system so that it can serve everyone. 
                                                
28 van Lier, Piet, Authorized Abuse: Sponsors, Management, and Ohio Charter School Law. Policy Matters Ohio, 
September 2010. 
